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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
RICK KEITH CATES, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF THE APPELLANT 
Appeal from the Judgment and Order of Commitment 
Eighth District Court 
Uintah County, State of Utah 
Honorable John R. Anderson 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Rick Keith Cates, Defendant and Appellant, through counsel, appeals his 
conviction on one count of burglary of a dwelling, a second degree felony, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1973). The court of appeals has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
1 
Appellate Case No. 990402-CA 
Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW, 
WITH STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 
The sole issue for review is whether the trial court erred in interpreting the 
burglary statute to include the victims' rented trailer, briefly situated in the mountains for 
use during the deer hunt, within the meaning of a "dwelling" rather than "building," with 
the result that Cates was convicted of second degree not third degree felony burglary. 
Standard of Review 
The court of appeals reviews the trial court's interpretation of a statute for 
correctness, giving no deference to the trial court's determinations. State v. Maguire, 
924 P.2d 904, 906 (Utah App. 1996), cert, denied, 931 P.2d 146 (Utah 1997). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 (1973). 
This statute is reproduced verbatim below. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
On November 5, 1998 Cates initially was charged with seven counts: (I) 
aggravated burglary, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203; (II) 
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302; (III) 
theft, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404; (IV) unlawful 
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possession or use of a controlled substance, marijuana, a class B misdemeanor, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(I); (V) possession of drug paraphernalia, a 
class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l); (VI) purchase, 
possession or transfer of a handgun by a restricted person, a third degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-503(3)(a); and (VII) attempted dangerous weapon 
penalty enhancement, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-203. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
On December 16,1998 Cates had a preliminary hearing. The trial court dismissed 
count (VI), purchase, possession of transfer of a handgun by a restricted person. 
However, it bound Cates over on, and he denied, the other counts. 
On January 27,1999, at a change of plea hearing, Cates admitted to an amended 
information charging him with three counts: (I) aggravated robbery, a first degree felony, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302; (II) burglary of a dwelling, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202; and (III) theft, a second degree 
felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404. All other charges were dismissed. 
C. Disposition at Trial Court 
On April 6, 1999 the trial court sentenced Cates to concurrent terms at the Utah 
State Prison as follows: count (I), aggravated robbery, five years to life; count (II), 
burglary of a dwelling, one to fifteen years; and count (III), theft, one to fifteen years. 
Cates presently is serving his sentence in state prison. 
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RELEVANT FACTS 
The facts, which Cates does not dispute, may be stated briefly. Early in the 
evening of November 3, 1998 Cates and co-defendant Ben Cates, his brother, were 
driving in the vicinity of Blue Mountain Road, a remote area on Blue Mountain, inside 
Utah near the border with Colorado. They saw a trailer. They stopped, armed 
themselves with a shotgun and pistol, and entered the trailer where they encountered 
Andrew Sunkees, his wife and a baby. Tr. Preliminary Hearing 6-9. Cates and his 
brother questioned the victims about items in their possession and ultimately stole a 
muzzle-loader, a hunting knife, and a small amount of money. Id. at 9-12. They then 
left. Sunkees immediately used a cellphone, which he had denied having, to call for 
help. Id. Police apprehended Cates and his brother on the highway near Blue 
Mountain. All the stolen property, along with marijuana and drug paraphernalia, was 
recovered in Cates' vehicle. Id. at 49-54. 
Sunkees' trailer was a twenty-four foot Mallard with sleeping quarters inside. He 
had rented the trailer from a dealer in Vernal and taken it to Blue Mountain for use 
during the deer hunt. It had been on site for one full day and night. It was to be returned 
to the dealer after the hunt. Id. at 7,18-19. 
At the preliminary hearing, Cates, through counsel, attempted inter alia to 
persuade the court that Sunkees' trailer was not a dwelling and therefore the burglary 
charge should be dismissed. Id. at 58-60. The court rejected this argument, saying that 
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because the trailer was used for sleeping it was a dwelling within the meaning of the 
burglary statute. Id. at 65-66. At the change of plea hearing, specifically in reference to 
count (II), burglary of a dwelling, Cates renewed his claim that the trailer was not a 
dwelling. The court allowed him to argue the matter further but, in the end, remained 
unconvinced. Tr. Plea Hearing 9-12. As a result, Cates' plea to count (II) was made 
conditionally, preserving the right to appeal the trial court's interpretation, pursuant to 
State v. Sery, 758 P.2d 935 (Utah App. 1988). Tr. Plea Hearing 8. Paragraph 23 of 
Cates9 affidavit of defendant in advance of guilty plea and agreement also expressly 
preserved the right to appeal this particular issue. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
A rented trailer, briefly situated in the mountains for use during the deer hunt, is 
not a dwelling within the meaning of the burglary statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202 
(1973). Arguably, while a dwelling must be used for overnight occupancy, it also must 
have the attributes of a home, such as permanency in one location and placement in an 
area regularly used for residential purposes. The trailer, in this case, had none of the 
attributes of a home and more properly should have been deemed to be a building, 
subjecting Cates to less severe punishment. The wording of the statute itself supports 
such a view. Also, cases from other jurisdictions hold that trailers are not dwellings and, 
for the offense of burglary of a dwelling to lie, the structure involved must be 
permanently affixed to the ground or otherwise immobile. Finally, a Utah search and 
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seizure statute, along with search and seizure case law generally, distinguishes trailers 
and dwellings and provides a useful analytical framework for determining when a trailer 
can and does rise to the level of a dwelling. Applying the framework to this case leads to 
the result that the victims' trailer is not a dwelling and should not be regarded as such 
under the burglary statute. 
ARGUMENT 
At issue is whether a rented trailer, briefly situated in the mountains for use during 
the deer hunt, is a dwelling within the meaning of the burglary statute, Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-202 (1973). Section 76-6-202 provides: 
(1) A person is guilty of burglary if he enters or remains 
unlawfully in a building or any portion of a building with 
intent to commit a felony or theft or commit an assault on 
any person. 
(2) Burglary is a felony of the third degree unless it 
was committed in a dwelling, in which event it is a felony of 
the second degree. 
"Building" and "dwelling" are not defined in the section. However, they are given some 
definition, statutorily, in Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-201 (1973): 
(1) "Building," in addition to its ordinary meaning, 
means any watercraft, aircraft, trailer, sleeping car, or 
other structure or vehicle adapted for overnight accommo-
dation of persons or for carrying on business therein and 
includes: 
(a) each separately secured or occupied 
portion of the structure or vehicle; and 
(b) each structure appurtenant to or 
connected with the structure or vehicle. 
(2) "Dwelling" means a building which is usually 
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occupied by a person lodging therein at night, whether or 
not a person is actually present. 
Judicial interpretation of the burglary statute, specifically where the phrases "building" 
and "dwelling" are applied to particular facts, is minimal in this jurisdiction. The case 
most in point, State v. Cox, 826 P.2d 656 (Utah App. 1992), holds that a cabin in the 
mountains which is occupied less than fifty percent of the time is a dwelling within the 
definition in subsection 76-6-201(2). To date, no appellate court has determined 
whether a movable trailer, briefly situated in the mountains for use during the deer hunt, 
as opposed to a cabin, permanently located in the mountains for at least part-time 
residential living, is a dwelling, or as Cates believes, a building. 
In Cox the court of appeals did not deal with the possible significance of the 
movability or immovability of a structure, that is, its permanency or lack of permanency 
in one location, in deciding whether it was a dwelling. The case involved a mountain 
cabin permanently affixed to the ground. The issue that defendant raised was the extent 
to which the cabin was occupied. Defendant argued that the cabin that was not "usually 
occupied." The victim testified that indeed he spent just two or three days a week at the 
cabin. The court rejected defendant's argument and implicitly declined to specify any 
period of time that someone must occupy a structure before the structure constitutes a 
dwelling. The court instead looked to the purpose for which a structure is used. 
If the structure is one in which people typically stay overnight, 
it fits within the definition of dwelling under the burglary 
statute. ...[0]ur second degree burglary statute is intended 
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to protect people while in places where they are likely to be 
living and sleeping overnight, as opposed to protecting 
property in buildings such as stores, business offices, or 
garages. 
Cox, supra, at 662. The cabin, in the facts of the case, was deemed to be a dwelling. 
Defendant's second degree burglary conviction was affirmed. 
Cox is in accord with a trend, in some jurisdictions, to extend the definition of 
dwelling, from its strict common law meaning of the fixed place of abode of another, to 
various structures and objects. However, little thought appears to have been given to 
what some of these structures are in reality. The question arises whether a slippery slope 
has been created, such that structures are considered to be dwellings when they truly are 
not and individuals convicted of burglary are sentenced more harshly than they should 
be. Query if a large cardboard box, used as overnight accommodations by a transient in 
the inner city, can be the subject of burglary of a dwelling. Query if a boat in the 
driveway, used as lodgings by an errant spouse, banished from the bedroom, can be the 
subject of burglary of a dwelling. Query if a mountain shelter, temporarily erected by a 
hiking club and used as a place to spend the night in inclement weather, can be the 
subject of burglary of a dwelling. Query if, in this case, a rented trailer, briefly situated 
in the mountains for use during the deer hunt, can be the subject of burglary of a 
dwelling. 
At least two jurisdictions, considering whether a structure is a dwelling, treat 
occupancy as significant, as Utah does. However, occupancy is not controlling. These 
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jurisdictions also view, as very important, the attributes of the structure, in particular its 
permanency. 
Virginia has considered the matter extensively. The rule that has emerged there is 
that "in order for a structure to be the subject of burglary, [it] must be permanently 
affixed to the ground so as to become part of the realty at the time of the unlawful entry." 
Dalton v. Commonwealth, 418 S.E.2d 563, 565 (Va. App. 1992). Thus, a chicken 
house may be the subject of burglary. Compton v. Commonwealth, 55 S.E.2d 446, 449 
(Va. 1949). However, a converted school bus, not permanently affixed to the ground, 
may not be. Crews v. Commonwealth, 352 S.E.2d 1, 4 (Va. App. 1987). An office 
trailer, permanently affixed to the ground, may be the subject of burglary. Buie v. 
Commonwealth, 465 S.E.2d 596, 598 (Va. App. 1996). Significantly, the trailer, in 
Buie, rested on blocks positioned along its underside, had fixed steps from the ground to 
an elevated doorway, was surrounded by a secure fence, and was serviced by electricity. 
Id. at 597-98. But a trailer, not permanently affixed to the ground, may not the subject 
of burglary. Graybeal v. Commonwealth, 324 S.E.2d 698, 739-40 (Va. 1985). 
Missouri also has considered the matter in depth. Two cases from that jurisdiction 
are particularly instructive. State v. Ryun, 549 S.W.2d 141, 144 (Mo. App. 1977), holds 
that a house trailer or mobile home, which was the sole place of abode and living 
quarters of occupants, was a "dwelling house" within the meaning of the burglary statute. 
Defendant contended that the trailer was not a dwelling and that he improperly was 
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convicted of burglary of a dwelling. However, the court rejected the argument. It 
determined that the trailer was a dwelling because it had not been moved since being 
towed to its resting place three years before, it was skirted from floor to ground to block 
air circulation and drafts, and it was connected to an electricity transmission line. Id. On 
the other hand State v. Scilagy, 579 S.W.2d 814, 819 (Mo. App. 1979), holds that a 
forty-foot semitrailer, despite the fact that it contained a bedroom facility which was used 
for that purpose, could not be the subject of burglary. The trailer was parked at a 
shopping center and part of carnival that went from place to place. At the time of the 
offense, to-wit a break-in and theft of a cash bag, the trailer was on wheels and fully 
mobile and it was not equipped for water or sewer hookup. Id. at 816-17. The court 
expressly contrasted the semitrailer with the victims' trailer in Ryun. At 819. 
On the basis of these cases from other jurisdictions, Cates believes that not only 
the purpose of a structure but its physical attributes and characteristics should be 
considered in determining, in Utah, whether that structure is a dwelling within the 
meaning of the burglary statute. There is arguably support for this position in the very 
language of the statute. A "dwelling" is "a building which is usually occupied by a 
person lodging therein at night, whether or not a person is actually present." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-201(2). However, a "building" includes, in its definition, "any ... trailer ... 
or vehicle adapted for overnight accommodation of persons ...." Utah Code Ann. § 
76-6-201(1) (emphasis added). The plain meaning is that any trailer used for sleeping 
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overnight is a building, not dwelling. Any interpretation to the contrary is erroneous. "A 
fundamental principle of statutory interpretation is that unambiguous language in the 
statute itself may not be interpreted so as to contradict its plain meaning." Johnson v. 
Utah State Retirement Board, 770 P.2d 93, 95 (Utah 1988). Accordingly, burglary 
committed in a dwelling, where people live and sleep, is a second degree felony, but 
burglary in a trailer, despite the fact that people may be sleeping there, is only a third 
degree felony. 
The distinction that Cates is making is one that the State itself draws in Utah Code 
Ann. § 23-20-1(2), though admittedly in another context. Conservation officers, who 
have police powers, may engage in warrantless searches of "vehicles, camps, or other 
places," including no doubt trailers located in the mountains during hunting season, if 
there is probable cause to believe that illegally taken wildlife is contained in those 
locations. However, officers may execute searches of "an occupied or unoccupied 
dwelling" only if they first obtain a warrant. A trailer and a dwelling are recognized as 
being quite different. Were a citizen to challenge warrantless police search of his trailer, 
briefly situated in the mountains for use during the deer hunt, the State certainly would 
argue that he had no Fourth Amendment or article I, section 14 protection because a 
trailer is not a dwelling within the meaning of the law. 
There is irony here, and it goes further. That courts should take into account not 
just occupancy of a structure, but its physical attributes and characteristics, is an 
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argument advanced by the government in justifying warrantless intrusion into citizens' 
living quarters by armed, sometimes masked men, namely police in search and seizure 
cases. If the living quarters do not possess what California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386 
(1985), refers to as 'the attributes of a home," an exception to the general warrant 
requirement may exist. It did exist in Carney. The United States supreme court 
determined that respondent's mobile home, which was the subject of a warrantless police 
search for drugs, had more of the characteristics of an automobile than a home. It was, 
for example, on wheels and easily could have been moved beyond the reach of police. 
Whether trailers or mobile homes are dwellings, in search and seizure cases, is a 
fact-intensive question. See generally Wayne R. LaFave, Search and Seizure, A 
Treatise on the Fourth Amendment § 7.2 (1996). Specific matters to inquire into 
include whether the trailer was readily mobile, whether it was subject to government 
regulation and control as a vehicle or house, whether it was in a place regularly used for 
residential purposes, whether it was connected to utilities, and whether it was in a place 
open to the public and available for public use. Significantly, in this case, application of 
such factors clearly suggests that Sunkees' trailer should not be considered to be a 
dwelling within the meaning of the burglary statute. It was mobile, not affixed to the 
ground or otherwise permanently placed in its location. Indeed it was only briefly 
situated in the mountains, for use during the deer hunt, and to be returned to the dealer 
afterwards. Presumably it was a vehicle, not a house, and licensed as a vehicle. It was in 
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a remote spot in the mountains, in a place not regularly used for residential purposes. 
There is no evidence that it was connected to utilities. It was not connected to a phone 
line; Sunkees used his cellphone to call police. Finally, as the trailer was located in the 
mountains, for the deer hunt, it was in a place open to hunting, that is, a place available 
for use of the general public with hunting licenses and permits. 
Arguably, therefore, the court of appeals should add to the only criterion used in 
Cox to determine whether a structure is a dwelling, that is, the purpose for which it is 
used, to include the physical attributes and characteristics of the structure. Two criteria, 
nighttime occupancy and attributes of a home, should be used simultaneously for 
purposes of analysis. If both are present, the structure in question should be deemed to 
be dwelling under the burglary statute. However, if both are not present, the structure 
should be considered to be a building. Attributes of a home are necessary because, as 
the burglary statute even now recognizes, a trailer as well as a dwelling can be used for 
overnight occupancy but a trailer and a dwelling are clearly distinguishable. Cases from 
other jurisdictions hold that, for the crime of burglary of a dwelling to lie, a structure 
must possess certain attributes, in particular permanency. Utah Code Ann. § 23-20-1(2) 
differentiates between movable (vehicles, camps, etc.) and immovable (dwellings) places, 
in wildlife search and seizure cases, reminding us that the law does regard, as important, 
the nature of a structure, not just whether people may be sleeping inside it. The degree 
to which structures such as trailers and mobile homes are or are not like dwellings is an 
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important and recurrent issue in search and seizure cases generally, with application, 
Cates believes, to this case. 
In short, for the reasons set forth above, the trial court erred in interpreting the 
burglary statute, Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-202, to include Sunkees' trailer within the 
meaning of a "dwelling." The trailer was a "building," not "dwelling." Cates should 
have been convicted of third degree rather than second degree felony burglary. 
CONCLUSION 
The court of appeals should reverse Cates' conviction on count (II), burglary of a 
dwelling, a second degree felony, and remand his case to the trial court for proceedings 
consistent with its opinion. 
DATED this ^ day of November, 1999. 
VASc* 
WESLEY M. BADEN 
Attorney for Defendant and Appellant 
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NO ADDENDUM 
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(l 1), Utah R. App. P., notice is given that no addendum to 
the brief of the appellant is necessary. 
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